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Evidence for cognition without grammar from causal reasoning
and ‘theory of mind’ in an agrammatic aphasic patient
Rosemary Varley* and Michael Siegal†
Understanding the inter-relationship between language
and thought is fundamental to the study of human
cognition [1–3]. Some investigators have proposed that
propositions in natural language serve to scaffold
thinking, by providing, for example, a sequential
structure to a massively parallel process [4]. Others have
maintained that certain thoughts, such as inferring the
mental states of others, termed ‘theory of mind’ (ToM)
reasoning, and identifying causal relationships,
necessarily involve language propositions [5]. It has
been proposed that ToM reasoning depends upon the
possession of syntactic structures such as those that
permit the embedding of false propositions within true
statements (‘Mary knows that John (falsely) thinks
chocolates are in the cupboard’) [6]. The performance on
reasoning tasks of individuals with severe agrammatic
aphasia (an impairment of language following a lesion
of the perisylvian areas of the language-dominant
hemisphere) offers novel insights into the relation
between grammar and cognition. We report the unusual
case of a patient with agrammatic aphasia of such
severity that language propositions were not apparently
available at an explicit processing level in any modality
of language use. Despite this profound impairment in
grammar, he displayed simple causal reasoning and
ToM understanding. Thus, reasoning about causes and
beliefs involve processes that are independent of
propositional language. 
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Results and discussion
S.A. is a 53 year-old right-handed male who is a retired
police sergeant. Seven years prior to the research reported
here, he became suddenly aphasic. A sub-dural empyema
(a focal bacterial infection) in the left sylvian fissure was
diagnosed, with accompanying meningitis. A magnetic
resonance imaging scan revealed a large lesion of the left
hemisphere, encompassing much of the temporal lobe,
and extending to posterior regions of the frontal lobe and
inferior regions of the parietal lobe (Figure 1). The infec-
tion  was associated with vessel wall damage to branches
of the left middle cerebral artery, hence the large region of
damage to the perisylvian area. S.A. was left with a severe
motor speech disorder (apraxia) and aphasia. In contrast,
S.A.’s performance on a test of ‘executive function’ was
unimpaired. On the Wisconsin card sorting test [7], which
requires subjects to change strategy continually in
response to feedback, S.A.’s low error score placed him on
the 91st percentile of a normative sample matched for age
and education. 
The performance of S.A. on standard language measures
taken from the PALPA battery [8] is presented in Table 1.
S.A. scored at chance level on sentence comprehension
tasks in both understanding speech and in reading,
although nominal comprehension of both spoken and
written words was well above chance. A number of sen-
tence-processing theories suggest that intact verb process-
ing is central to both comprehension and construction of
sentences [9]. S.A. had profound difficulties with verb com-
prehension. Similarly, on a task requiring judgments of
whether written sentences are grammatical, S.A. again per-
formed at chance level. The ungrammatical sentences in
this set either conformed to universal language principles
but were not grammatical in English (for example, preposi-
tions following the head of a prepositional phrase), or vio-
lated universal principles (for example, prepositions
attached to the subject noun phrase). S.A.’s digit span score,
measured by presenting him with a string of spoken
numbers and asking him to recognise whether a second
string was the same or different, was three items. This span,
although below the expected score for normal subjects,
indicates that limited phonological memory capacity could
not account for his difficulties with grammar. Language
comprehension does not co-vary with phonological memory
capacity; the existence of patients with limited working
memory span but retained sentence comprehension indi-
cates that comprehension does not rely on prior storage of
information in phonological working memory [10].
S.A. preferred to use writing to communicate, owing to
low speech intelligibility. When he did speak, his utter-
ances were largely single elements of clause structure,
usually nouns. S.A.’s spontaneous writing consisted largely
of nouns, adjectives, and adverbs. No clauses were present
and phrases were limited to article–noun, adjective–noun,
and quantifier–noun combinations. When he was asked to
produce a sentence, S.A. either strung together lists of
nouns or created pseudo-grammatical sentences by inter-
spersing content items with grammatical words. Verbs did
not occur in his spontaneous spoken and written output
and, where they were prompted, the elicited forms were
of dubious predicate status (for example, ‘a brush hair’).
Examples of spontaneous writing and samples of writing
drawn from tasks on which S.A. was encouraged to
produce sentences are shown in Table 2. Owing to intelli-
gibility problems, his accuracy in production of noun
forms was difficult to establish in speech. In written
output, although noun retrieval was impaired, it was at a
higher level than verb retrieval. 
In summary, S.A. displayed a severe grammatical impair-
ment across input and output processing modalities in sen-
tence parsing (grammaticality judgments) and in sentence
and verb comprehension. The term ‘agrammatism’ is used
to refer to a spectrum of grammatical disorders [11], and
the complete loss of grammatical ability is very rare. Indi-
viduals described as agrammatic normally have residual
primitive grammatical capacity that enables them to
understand and construct simple language propositions
that would enable some grammatical support of thinking.
In contrast, S.A.’s impairment was profound. He showed
no evidence of an ability to formulate propositions in
speech or writing. He was not able to make judgments as
to whether a sentence is grammatical, or to match sen-
tences to pictures, or to identify the meaning of verbs.
S.A. completed a series of tasks (see Materials and
methods). In Experiment 1, S.A. received a number of
tests, including a causal knowledge test, the picture
arrangement test from the Wechsler adult intelligence scale
(WAIS) [12], and a ToM task consisting of ‘changed con-
tainer’ false-belief measures. Experiments 2 and 3 consisted
of further true- and false-belief tasks that aimed to expand
on and replicate the findings of the first ToM experiment.
S.A. retained abilities on all tasks. On causal reasoning, he
achieved a perfect score; his responses were rapid as well as
accurate. The WAIS picture-arrangement test produced a
score of 16/20, which places S.A. on the 84th percentile of a
normal age-matched population.
In addition, S.A. displayed ToM understanding in the
three experiments. He responded correctly in Experiment
1 to both the false-belief and reality control questions on
all but two of 20 trials. In Experiment 2, S.A. was correct
in responses to both the belief and reality questions on 19
out of 24 trials. The five errors on this test were all on
false-belief trials in which the reality questions were pre-
sented first. In these cases, S.A. responded with the
‘think’ answer first, followed by the ‘reality’ answer. An
experimental design that randomly interspersed true-
belief and false-belief trials challenged S.A.’s attention to
the test questions as, on half of the trials, the information
contained within the probe question was redundant. As a
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Figure 1
Structural magnetic resonance image in transverse plane displaying a
large left hemisphere lesion (white areas), extending across the
perisylvian area, with associated enlargement of the ventricular system
Table 1
Performance of S.A. on measures of language processing.
Test S.A. score Chance score
Spoken word–picture matching 35/40* 8/40
Written word–picture matching 37/40* 8/40
Spoken sentence–picture matching 1 23/60 20/60
Spoken sentence–picture matching 2 28/60 20/60
(re-test)
Written sentence–picture matching 15/30 10/30
Grammaticality judgments 19/30 15/30
Auditory comprehension of verbs 14/27 13.5/27
Auditory comprehension of adjectives 10/14 7/14
Written picture naming 24/60 –
*Scores significantly above chance at the p < 0.001 level. All tests were
taken from the PALPA battery [8] with the exception of grammaticality
judgements. Word–picture matching tests involve matching a word
(spoken or written, PALPA tests 47 and 48) to a picture, in the
presence of four semantic and/or visual foils (for example, to match a
picture of a candle in response to the word ‘candle’ from pictures of a
candle, match, lamp, lipstick, and glove). Sentence–picture matching
tasks involve matching a sentence (spoken or written, PALPA tests 55
and 56) to a picture in the presence of two foils. The stimuli include
reversible active and passive sentences (for example, to identify a
picture corresponding to the sentence ‘the girl is chasing the horse’ in
the presence of foils depicting a horse chasing a girl and a girl pulling a
horse). The majority of the stimuli contain three units of clause structure
that place minimal demands on short-term memory. The auditory
comprehension of verbs and adjectives (PALPA Test 57) requires the
subject to indicate whether a definition for a verb or adjective (for
example, ‘washing’) is correct or incorrect. S.A.’s above-chance score
on the comprehension of adjectives suggests that S.A. has specific
difficulties with verb understanding. Written picture naming (PALPA
Test 54) requires the subject to write down the name of a pictured item
(‘sheep’). Test stimuli are drawn from three word frequency bands.
result, S.A. may have failed to attend to the question and
instead fallen back on either an order-of-mention strategy
(the package is displayed first, and only subsequently are
the unanticipated contents displayed), or on a narrative
coherence strategy (giving the ‘think’ answer before the
true contents of the package are discovered). In this sense,
S.A. displayed his proficiency at using pragmatic strategies
to interpret language. This was also suggested by his
responses to the true-belief trials in which he was required
to provide identical answers to two questions. On these
trials, he illustrated his skill in recognizing the redundant
nature of a question by simply adding three exclamation
marks to his first response (see Figure 2). 
In the first ToM experiment, when S.A.’s attention was
fully engaged on the ‘think’/‘really’ distinction, he was
able to vary his response to counterbalanced false-belief
and reality questions. Thus, to replicate the results of the
first experiment, we carried out a third experiment con-
sisting of a further 12 false-belief trials. On this test, S.A.
was correct on the first item. On the second and third
trials, he lapsed back into the pattern shown in Experi-
ment 2 by giving the ‘think’ answer first and then the
‘reality’ one. He also reversed what would have been the
correct responses on the next two trials. However, at the
end of the fifth trial, S.A. signaled through his facial
expression that he had gained insight into the problem in
that his answers on this trial had been wrong. He then
produced a sequence of correct responses on all remain-
ing trials (7 correct response pairs). A runs test on the
pattern of his responses indicated that performance in
Experiment 3 rose significantly above chance (p < 0.025,
one-tailed), corroborating the results of Experiment 1.
Despite severe agrammatic aphasia, S.A. was able to
entertain and act upon propositions about the mental
and physical world. Moreover, his responses strongly
support the position that grammar is distinct and sepa-
rate from other cognitive systems such as pragmatic com-
petence [13,14]. The prefrontal cortex, which is
associated with executive planning of behavior, is bilat-
erally intact in S.A. [15]. Further, the right hemi-
sphere — unimpaired in this case — permits the
visuo-spatial representation and memory of the location
and attributes of objects [16]. Whereas functional neu-
roimaging studies of causal reasoning and ToM tasks
have pointed to complex cerebral activity that is not
limited to prefrontal regions (extending most notably to
the temporal region) [17,18], studies of stroke patients
have shown that damage to the right hemisphere is asso-
ciated with difficulties in following the implications of
conversation. These implications are crucial to pragmatic
competence [19] and involve the means to understand
the purpose and relevance of questions that contribute
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Figure 2
Examples of S.A.’s responses in Experiment 2. The top drawing
represents a correct response to a false-belief trial, whereas the middle
and bottom drawings represent correct responses on true-belief trials.
On the false-belief trial, S.A. was presented with a book in which the
center was hollowed out and with the cavity containing a necklace.
S.A. wrote ‘book’ in response to the question ‘What does X think is
inside the book?’, and drew the necklace around a person’s neck in
response to the question ‘What is really inside the book?’. The middle
and lower drawings depict instances in which the actual contents met
expectations (a Russian doll containing four smaller dolls, and a box of
tissues containing tissues). The redundancy of the questioning,
whether a true-belief or a reality question, is indicated by S.A. through
repeated exclamation marks. 
Table 2
Examples of written output in response to photograph of an
event.
woman — red — egg — sekonda marriage
a man as age — book
a age woman as white
a man as age as bacd as cards
a asia as man as black a shoes
a woman 8 year. a dog
babe a man — ladder
a sekonda as red as books
a letter as age
woman a radio
baby as wood
coloured a man — ball
age — orange
a iron — shirt as asia a man
girl a ball
woman a age the red a scissor
man the blue a orange
sekonda. woman the red a flower
woman a white as glass the red
The dashes were used by S.A. to indicate awareness that there is a
missing constituent in the sentence.
to causal reasoning and ToM understanding [20–22].
Therefore, the pattern of responses revealed in this case of
severe agrammatic aphasia attests to a dissociation between
grammar and cognition and to the modular nature of mature
brain functioning. Grammar may play a vital role in config-
uring cognitive processes, but once these processes have
been established, cognition can operate without grammar.
Material and methods
Experiment 1
Causal reasoning test
S.A. was presented with a picture card that depicted an event on the
left-hand side (for example, a car crashed into a tree). On the right-
hand side there were three pictures (the target, for example an alco-
holic drink, and two semantic associates, for example a helicopter and
an axe). S.A. pointed to indicate the likely cause of the event. In three
training trials, the cue ‘Why?’ was printed on the card and the task
explained to the participant. On the 15 test items, no further instruc-
tions were given. 
WAIS picture arrangement test
The standard WAIS procedure was used. A series of line drawings
were placed in front of the participant, who was asked to re-arrange the
cards so that these told a sensible story (for example, a simple item
involves three pictures displaying the stages in constructing a house).
Responses were timed and scored for accuracy and speed. 
Changed container task
S.A. was shown a familiar package that had an unexpected item
within it (for example, a pill bottle containing buttons). He was asked
what a third person, who had not seen the contents of the bottle,
would believe (falsely) was in the container [23]. In a pilot study, S.A.
had difficulty comprehending the false-belief questions owing to the
linguistic demands of the standard format ToM task. Experiment 1
was performed 12 months later, with S.A. having no exposure to ToM
tasks in the intervening period. In this experiment, S.A. was trained on
the linguistic content of the probe questions on non-ToM tasks prior
to the experimental trials. S.A. was given a bag containing a number
of balls. He was asked to feel the bag and to guess how many balls
were contained within. He was simultaneously presented with a cue
card with ‘think’ printed on it. He then opened the bag and was asked
to count the number of balls, and responded to the question ‘how
many are there really?’ while being simultaneously presented a card
with ‘really’ printed upon it. Once the think/really contrast had been
trained, a third person agent was added to ‘think’. S.A. was again
given a bag of balls which, after his exploration, was passed to a third
person. In the presence of a cue card ‘X thinks’, S.A. was asked to
state how many balls the third person might guess were in the bag.
S.A. rapidly understood what was required (only three trials of the ‘X
thinks’ were given). He then proceeded to the ToM task consisting of
20 trials of the changed container task. On each trial, S.A. was given
a false-belief question (‘what does X think is in the ____?’), with the
simultaneous presentation of the ‘X thinks’ cue card, and a reality
question (‘what is really in the _____?’), in the presence of the ‘really’
cue card. S.A. responded primarily through single word writing sup-
plemented by drawing and gesture. 
The first experiment contained no true-belief control condition, that is,
where the response to the belief question (‘what does X think is in Y?’)
was the same as that to the reality question (‘what really is in Y?’). This
was because the identical responses to ‘think’ and ‘really’ questions
might have cancelled the careful training of the predicate content that
is necessary for severely language impaired participants. As S.A. could
have achieved the correct answer by a route that did not involve ToM
understanding, a second experiment was carried out which contained
12 false-belief and 12 true-belief trials. Training of the predicates in the
non-ToM task again preceded the main test. 
Experiment 2 took place 20 months after Experiment 1 and S.A. com-
pleted a further ToM task containing both false-belief and true-belief trials.
Experiment 3 was conducted 6 weeks after Experiment 2, and consisted
of a further set of false-belief trials. In all experiments, the presentation
orders of the ‘think’ and ‘really’ questions in the ToM tasks were counter-
balanced across trials. None of the containers and contents was identical
across experiments. S.A.’s grammatical scores did not change across the
span of the study. Reassessment with PALPA sentence comprehension
tests revealed an unchanged written sentence-picture matching score,
and a slight increase in the score for spoken sentence–picture matching.
Acknowledgements
We thank S.A. for his willing participation, and colleagues at the University
of Sheffield, P.D. Griffiths (Department of Radiology), R. Grünewald and A.
Kenemy, (Department of Clinical Neurology) for their help with MRI imaging. 
References 
1. Fodor J: RePresentations. Hassocks: Harvester Press; 1981.
2. Hermer-Vazquez L, Spelke ES, Katsnelson AS: Sources of flexibility
in human cognition: dual-task studies of space and language.
Cog Psychol 1999, 39:3-36.
3. Pinker S: The Language Instinct. New York: William Morrow; 1994.
4. Clark A: Being there: Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 1996.
5. Carruthers P: Language, Thought and Consciousness: An Essay in
Philosophical Psychology. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press; 1996.
6. Astington JW, Jenkins JM: A longitudinal study of the relation
between language and theory-of-mind development. Dev Psychol
1999, 35:1311-1320.
7. Heaton RK, Chelune GJ, Talley JL, Kay GG, Curtiss G: Wisconsin Card
Sorting Test. Odessa: Psychological Assessment Resources; 1993.
8. Kay J, Lesser R, Coltheart M: Psycholinguistic Assessment of
Language Processing in Aphasia. Hove: Psychology Press; 1992.
9. Garrett M: Production of speech: observations from normal and
pathological language use. In Normality and Pathology in Cognitive
Functions. Edited by Ellis A. London: Academic Press; 1982.
10. Martin R: STM and sentence processing: evidence from
neuropsychology. Mem Cognit 1993, 21:176–183. 
11. Berndt RS, Caramazza A: How ‘regular’ is sentence comprehension
in Broca’s aphasia? It depends on how you select the patients.
Brain Lang 1999, 67:242-247.
12. Wechsler D: Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale — Revised. San
Antonio: The Psychological Corporation; 1981. 
13. Bloom P: Language capacities: Is grammar special? Curr Biol
1999, 9:R127-R128.
14. Chomsky N: Rules and Representations. Oxford: Blackwell; 1980.
15. Shallice T, Burgess P: Supervisory control of action and thought
selection. In Attention, Selection, Awareness and Control. A tribute
to Donald Broadbent. Edited by Baddeley A, Weiskrantz, L. Oxford:
Clarendon Press; 1993:171-187.
16. Jonides J, Smith EE, Koeppe RA, Awh E, Minoshima S, Mintun MA:
Spatial working memory in humans as revealed by PET. Nature
1993, 363:623-625.
17. Brunet E, Sardati Y, Hardy-Baylé M-C, Decety J: A PET investigation
of the attribution of intentions with a nonverbal task. Neuroimage
2000, 11:157-166.
18. Fletcher PC, Happé F, Frith U, Baker SC, Dolan RJ, Frackowiak RSJ,
Frith C: Other minds in the brain: a functional imaging study of
‘theory of mind’ in story comprehension. Cognition 1995,
57:109-128.
19. Grice HP: Logic and conversation. In Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 3:
Speech Acts. Edited by Cole P, Morgan JL. New York: Academic
Press; 1975:41-58.
20. Leslie AM: Pretending and believing: issues in the theory of ToMM.
Cognition 1994, 50:211-238.
21. Siegal M, Carrington J, Radel M: Theory of mind and pragmatic
understanding following right hemisphere damage. Brain Lang
1996, 53:40-50. 
22. Winner E, Brownell H, Happé F, Blum A, Pincus D: Distinguishing
lies from jokes: theory of mind deficits and discourse
interpretation in right hemisphere brain-damaged patients. Brain
Lang 1998, 62:89-106.
23. Wimmer H, Perner J: Beliefs about beliefs: representation and
constraining of wrong beliefs in young children’s understanding
of deception. Cognition 1983, 13:103-128. 
726 Current Biology Vol 10 No 12
